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Abstract 
This paper examines the public representation of, and family responses to, scientific 
studies into consciousness in coma-like states. We examine the publicity surrounding 
high-profile studies using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) on ‘vegetative’ or 
‘minimally conscious’ patients and compare this with family views. Our findings show how, 
with a few notable exceptions, the research was presented as an amazing breakthrough 
offering a potential ‘voice’ and choice for patients and hope and comfort for their families. 
We argue that such representations ignored key limitations, evoked unrealistic visions of 
recovery, and promoted very narrow representations of family reactions. The comparison 
between public representations of the science and responses from families with 
experience of this issue highlights the complex social/medical world into which 
neurotechnologies intervene, and points to the absence of a range of patient/family 
perspectives in public discourse. We conclude with suggestions for how those promoting 
the research, and the journalists reporting its implications, could act to ensure more 
responsible coverage and enhance public debate. 
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Introduction 
‘Patient in vegetative state plays tennis 
in her head’ 
‘Brain scan gives vegetative state 
patient the power to say yes and no’ 
These are the titles of the two major 
press releases from the UK’s Medical 
Research Council (in 2006 and 2010 
respectively). The press releases 
highlighted the research the Council had 
funded with severely brain-injured 
patients using a novel neurotechnology 
called functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). This technology enables 
scientists to go beyond looking at the 
physical structures of the brain to 
examine how the brain functions in 
response to different instructions. The 
research identified brain activity in 
‘vegetative’ patients, generating a peak in 
media interest, with headlines including: 
‘Think tennis for yes and home for no: 
how man trapped in his body ‘spoke’’ 
(Guardian 4 February, 2010); ‘For first 
time, doctors communicate with patient 
in persistent vegetative state’ (Guardian 8 
September, 2006) and ‘New hope after 
brain research’ (Sunday Express, 7 
February, 2010). 
As social scientists working in the field of 
serious brain injury we often encounter 
comments from colleagues and 
acquaintances suggesting that such 
coverage left a lasting impression of a 
technology with great potential to 
transform the lives of patients and their 
families. However, our interviews with 
families with personal experience of this 
issue presents a far more nuanced 
picture. This article critically reviews the 
public representation of these fMRI 
studies and contextualizes this in 
relation to the everyday challenges of 
family experience.  
The paper is located within several 
interlocking strands of sociological and 
media/cultural research. First, it builds 
on research into the social and ethical 
implications of science in general, and 
neurotechnologies in particular. Such 
work includes analysis of the history of 
neuroscience (Abi-Rached & Rose 2010), 
the construction of the concept of the 
‘neuro-chemical self’ (Rose 2003), the 
anticipatory discourse around the 
promise of neuro-therapies (Pickersgill 
2011), and the need for a ‘neuroethics’ 
(Illes et al 2003). Secondly, this article 
builds on research into the ‘sociology of 
expectations’ and related work on the 
‘political economy of hope’ (Brown 2006; 
Delvecchio Good et al 1990; Petersen & 
Seear 2011). Many scholars have argued 
that a ‘political economy’ or ‘rhetoric’ of 
hope has now become the dominant 
discourse of science, and research and 
development is justified by ‘the promise 
of finding miraculous cures for 
debilitating illnesses’ (Moreira & Palladino 
2005: 67). Sociology of expectations 
scholars note a similar influence via the 
active generation of promises and 
positive expectations about new 
technologies (Brown 2003). As Geels and 
Smit argue: 
Initial promises are set high in 
order to attract attention from 
(financial) sponsors, to stimulate 
agenda-setting processes (both 
technical and political) and to 
build ‘protected spaces’. Promises 
thus play a role in the social 
processes that are part of 
technological development (Geels 
& Smit 2000: 881-882).  
Such ‘promises’ can be made via 
practices in the lab, grant applications, 
publications, and via press releases and 
media statements – it is these last two 
areas which are the focus of this article. 
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Our work thus also links directly to 
research on public relations activities 
and the media which has repeatedly 
flagged up how public representations of 
innovative technologies tend to be 
optimistic, proclaim imminent medical 
benefits and deploy ‘human interest’ and 
emotions to sell a story/a technology. 
This has been applied to a broad range 
of work including human genetics/stem 
cell research (e.g. (Conrad 2001; Durant 
& Hansen 1995; Goodell 1977; Haran et 
al 2008; Höijer 2010; Mulkay 1994; 
Nelkin 1996; Peters 1995; Rogers & 
Chang 1991; Seale 2003; Wahl-
Jorgensen 2012; Williams et al 2003) and 
neuroscience (Racine et al 2005; Racine 
et al 2007; Racine et al 2010).  
The study presented in this article adds 
to the body of literature outlined above, 
offering a timely case study of the public 
relations strategies and media coverage 
of the rapidly expanding area of ‘brain 
science’ (see Nuffield Bioethics Council, 
2013). An extra dimension is given to the 
analysis by including reflections from 
families directly implicated in such 
developments. Our work thus offers a 
significant addition to existing research 
on ‘science in the media’; alongside 
expanding research on the families of 
those in vegetative or minimally 
conscious states. In particular, we would 
note that research with families has 
tended to focus on their psychological 
needs (highlighting issues such as 
depression or so-called ‘prolonged grief 
disorder’) – whereas we look to our 
interviewees as a potential source of 
insight that might usefully contribute to 
good practice. 
In the sections that follow, we start by 
outlining the definition of disorders of 
consciousness such as the ‘vegetative’ 
state, and summarising the key fMRI 
studies. We then introduce our research 
design and present the analysis of the 
media coverage and responses from 
families, before concluding by reflecting 
on the implications for those involved in 
promoting and representing scientific 
work and making recommendations for 
change. 
 
What are the ‘vegetative’ and the 
‘minimally conscious’ states?  
The popular image of being in ‘a coma’ is 
of an individual, supported by machines, 
lying in a peaceful sleep like state 
(Wijdicks & Wijdicks 2006). A staple 
device in fiction (films, TV drama and 
novels) is to have this patient deliver a 
coherent monologue (implying a fully 
functioning consciousness beneath the 
cloak of unconsciousness) and/or to 
suddenly ‘wake up’ – often with few 
outstanding neurological problems 
except perhaps some memory loss 
convenient to the plot (Kitzinger & 
Kitzinger 2012). The factual news media 
often promote similar images and stories 
– sometimes presenting scientific 
inaccuracies and confusing use of 
terminology (Bernat 2008; Latronico et al 
2011; Racine et al 2008) and giving high 
profile coverage to very rare cases of 
patients who show some recovery long 
after clinicians had given up hope (Fins 
et al 2007).  
Although comas lasting a few weeks can, 
in part, resemble the images in fictional 
and factual media described above (and 
there are some well documented cases 
of ‘miracle’ recoveries), the routine reality 
of long term coma-like conditions is 
rather different. After a few weeks in a 
coma a patient who does not die, or 
wake up, usually enters either a 
‘vegetative’ or a ‘minimally conscious’ 
state. Patients in vegetative states have 
all their automatic functions such as 
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being able to breathe and are usually 
independent of all machines apart from 
the one delivering artificial nutrition and 
hydration. They display cycles of eye 
opening and closing (a sleep-wake cycle), 
and have reflexes such as retracting 
from pain; however, they have no 
apparent awareness of themselves or 
their environment (Royal College of 
Physicians 2003). Patients in ‘minimally 
conscious states’ (a new diagnosis only 
formally defined in 2002) appear 
unconscious much of the time, but 
occasionally show some minimal 
awareness e.g. saying words or showing 
emotional responses to family members 
(Giacino et al 2002). After 12 months in a 
vegetative state gaining full 
consciousness is considered highly 
unlikely (hence the term ‘permanent 
vegetative state’); patients can recover 
full consciousness after much longer in 
MCS (perhaps even after several years) – 
however, even if they recover full 
consciousness they are likely to be left 
with severe physical and mental 
disabilities. 
The distinction between vegetative and 
minimally conscious conditions is 
important not only because it has 
implications for prognosis (e.g. likelihood 
of a return to full consciousness), but 
because it has implications for care (e.g. 
the provision of pain relief) and legal 
ramifications (e.g. in relation to treatment 
withdrawal). However, diagnosis at the 
borderline of the vegetative state [VS] 
and minimally conscious states [MCS] 
can be very challenging and there is a 
high rate of misdiagnosis (Andrews et al 
1996). This may be not least because of 
the fluctuating nature of awareness for 
patients in MCS (and potential 
complicating conditions such as 
blindness or deafness). Attempts to 
improve diagnostic accuracy include 
refining formalised bedside clinical 
examination repeated at different times, 
and taking into account family 
observations. Incorporating assessment 
of family interactions with the patient is 
crucial as although families may 
sometimes misinterpret mere reflexes, 
their intimacy with the patient and 
bedside vigils may mean they trigger, 
and are there to record, genuine 
moments of consciousness (Turner-
Stokes et al 2012). 
 
What is fMRI and what does fMRI with 
‘vegetative’ and ‘minimally conscious’ 
patients demonstrate? 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
is a novel brain imaging technique that 
works by detecting, over time, small 
changes in blood oxygenation that occur 
after increased local brain activity. fMRI 
output data is represented as a digital 
image – with a number of statistical 
analyses being conducted between 
image acquisition and interpretation in 
order to generate the classic and 
compelling image of different parts of the 
brain ‘lighting up’. Whilst there have 
been, and continue to be, many different 
efforts to use various neurotechnologies 
to investigate consciousness in severely 
brain injured patients (Fernandez-Espejo 
et al 2011; Goldfine et al 2011; John et al 
2011), fMRI has been the most high-
profile.  
The two fMRI scientific papers that first 
burst into the public domain both 
involved the neuroscientist Adrian Owen. 
One study was published in 2006, 
another in 2010. The 2006 study involved 
a 23-year old woman who had been 
diagnosed as vegetative (Owen et al 
2006) – fMRI was used to scan the 
woman’s brain whilst she was asked to 
imagine different tasks. The researchers 
found that the patient’s neural responses 
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were indistinguishable from those 
observed in healthy volunteers via fMRI. 
They concluded that ‘this patient 
retained the ability to understand spoken 
commands and to respond to them 
through her brain activity ’ and ‘confirmed 
beyond any doubt that she was 
consciously aware of herself and her 
surroundings’ (1402). 
In 2010 the research went even further 
(Monti et al 2010) – this time the team 
reported that fMRI research with 54 
patients identified that ‘five were able to 
wilfully modulate their brain activity’ (p. 
579). Such brain activity was 
ascertainable via fMRI even though in 
two of these cases the patient would 
have otherwise had a ‘vegetative’ 
diagnosis as ‘no voluntary behaviour 
could be detected by means of clinical 
assessment’ (p. 579). The researchers 
reported that one man, who at the time 
of scanning showed ‘signs of awareness 
… consistent with the minimally 
conscious state’ (p. 585), was able to use 
their technique to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
questions during the fMRI. The authors 
concluded that ‘with further development 
this technique could be used by some 
patients to express their thoughts, 
control their environment, and increase 
their quality of life’ (p. 589). 
So, how was the 2006 and 2010 
research profiled in the media; how were 
the implications for families presented; 
and how does this compare to what 
families in this situation say about the 
condition of their relative and their 
expectations for the future? The next 
section of this paper outlines how we 
explored these questions. 
Methods 
The newspaper archive was compiled by 
searching all UK newspapers via the 
Nexis database for the month around 
publication of each of the fMRI studies 
(i.e., 8 September to 7 October 2006 and 
4 February to 3 March 2010). We used 
the broad search term ‘brain’ because 
using the search term ‘fMRI’ risked 
missing items where technological 
acronyms had been avoided. The results 
from the ‘brain’ search were then 
skimmed to locate all articles which 
discussed the fMRI studies, identifying a 
total of 51 items (32 straight news 
reports, 19 commentary pieces). 
Wherever possible the original version of 
the reports were also obtained either 
from hard copy archives or from the 
paper’s own website, allowing us to see 
layout and images. All reports were then 
analysed thematically to explore how 
fMRI was framed and systematically 
indexed to record any references to 
limitations of the fMRI studies or their 
implications; how the media represented 
the potential future (both for the 
technology and for the patients); and the 
portrayal of family reactions. 
Family members with personal 
experience of this issue were reached via 
a brain injury support group. Six 
individuals expressed interest and were 
provided with an information sheet, and 
consent was gained to interview in each 
case (one interview was conducted as a 
joint session with husband and wife). It 
was not our intention to recruit a 
representative sample of participants for 
interview. Rather, these interviews were 
designed to investigate the experience of 
specific individuals within this (often 
neglected) population and to provide a 
deeper understanding of the views of 
different individuals’ with experience of 
this issue. As might be expected, given 
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the declared focus of the research, all six 
interviewees had been previously aware 
of fMRI and had considered it for their 
own relative – in fact three of the 
patients had undergone an fMRI. At the 
point of interview, three of the relatives 
remained in a vegetative or minimally 
conscious state, one had died while still 
in a disorder of consciousness, and one 
had regained full consciousness, 
although remains severely disabled (see 
Table 1). 
Interviews were semi-structured, face-to-
face and lasted between one and two 
hours, and were conducted by the first 
author. Interviews took place in a 
location of the participants’ own 
choosing (usually their home). It was 
important that we met away from the 
hospital setting and were not linked to 
the fMRI experimental studies in any way, 
which might have inhibited what 
interviewees felt able to say. 
Interviews commenced with a broad 
discussion about interviewees’ 
experiences of having a relative with a 
disorder of consciousness, and their 
understanding and opinions about the 
use of fMRI with such patients. Following 
this, participants were shown newspaper 
articles reporting on the studies 
conducted by Owen and colleagues. 
These were taken from the Daily Mail 
(2006); the Independent (2006); the 
Mirror (2010) and The Times (2010) – 
chosen because they provided a variety 
of articles from broadsheets, mid-range 
and tabloid newspapers [See Fig 1]. 
Discussion was then prompted around 
participants’ views about these specific 
studies and the associated media 
reporting. 
 
 
Table 1: Details of the sample (Note: all patients who had an fMRI scan did so within 8 months of injury – 
i.e., prior to obtaining a ‘permanent’ vegetative diagnosis) 
 
Interviewee 
(pseudonym) 
 
Patient 
(pseudonym) 
 
Did the patient 
have fMRI  
 
 
Results of fMRI  
(as reported by 
interviewee) 
Time since 
injury (at 
time of 
interview) 
 
Highest 
diagnosis 
reached 
(according to 
interviewee) 
Alison Andrew Yes 
No awareness 
detected 4 years 
Permanent 
Vegetative State 
[PVS] 
Eli Ethan Yes 
Suggested some 
awareness 4 years 
Minimally 
Conscious State 
(now deceased) 
Trudy Tracey Yes  
Suggested some 
awareness 2 years 
Severely 
disabled 
Rachel Ronald 
No – family 
wanted it, but 
patient not 
eligible 
n/a 
1.5yrs PVS  
Laura and 
Neil Lavena 
Suggested but 
not pursued by 
family 
n/a 
9 years PVS 
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All interviews were audio recorded and 
fully transcribed, amounting to 177 
pages of transcript. Transcriptions were 
thematically analysed using NVIVO – 
each transcript being systematically 
coded for issues such as how 
interviewees first heard about fMRI; 
interviewees’ opinions about the pros 
and cons of fMRI; and the way they 
spoke about ‘hope’. In the interests of 
confidentiality, all names used in this 
article have been changed to 
pseudonyms. Some other identifying 
details have also been altered.
 
 
Figure 1: Headlines: top left: Mail 2006; top right: Independent 2006; middle: The Times 2010; bottom: 
Mirror 2010 
Findings 
 
The public representation of the fMRI 
studies  
 
The Medical Research Council’s press 
releases which launched the fMRI studies 
into the public domain emphasised the 
originality of the work e.g. a ‘new method’ 
that had ‘never before been tried’ (MRC, 
2010) and portrayed the results as 
‘exciting’ (MRC, 2006) and ‘startling’ (MRC, 
2010). The titles of both press releases 
foregrounded the personal – framing the 
results in terms of one individual 
patient’s ability to think, communicate or 
make choices e.g., declaring that fMRI 
bestowed ‘the power to say yes and no’ 
(MRC, 2010). This mood of excitement 
was closely echoed in the majority of 
press coverage. Indeed, much of the 
coverage was largely based on 
reproducing chunks of the press release 
– an increasingly common practice of 
what is known as ‘churnalism’ (Davies 
2009; Williams & Clifford 2009). The 
studies were described as ‘ground-
breaking’ (The Times 4 February, 2010), 
‘epoch-making’ (Independent 5 February, 
2010), ‘remarkable’ (Guardian 11 
September, 2006) and ‘spectacular’ 
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(Telegraph 8 September, 2006). 
Journalists referred to the scientists as 
‘shocked’ (Mirror 4 February, 2010) and 
‘stunned’ (Morning Star 5 February, 2010) 
by what they had discovered, and the 
technology’s practical ‘medical’ 
implications were emphasised. The Sun, 
for example, went into hyperbole 
overload, breathlessly headling its report: 
‘Astonishing Breakthrough Medical 
Miracle’ (4 February, 2010). Reports 
repeatedly displayed compelling graphic 
images of brains ‘lighting up’ and the 
insights provided by fMRI were presented 
as a form of mind-reading or what the 
Sunday Times’ headline called a 
‘Telepathic leap’ (Sunday Times 7 
February, 2010). Reporting emphasised 
the idea of patients gaining a voice 
through headlines such as: ‘Coma 
woman ‘hears and talks’ to doctors’ 
(Express 8 September, 2006); ‘Coma 
victim ‘speaks’….’ (Mirror 4 February, 
2010) and ‘Brain damage patients CAN 
‘talk’’ (Sun 8 September, 2006).  
Reports rarely mentioned that only a 
minority of the patients had responded 
to the fMRI task and did not discuss the 
implications for ‘non-responders’ and 
their families. Instead there was a 
tendency to generalize (as if all 
vegetative patients might have 
consciousness), to extrapolate or make 
allusions/associations to other states, 
and to draw conclusions from such 
extrapolation. For example, under the 
headline ‘We now know that patients in a 
vegetative state can hear and think’, the 
Daily Mail recorded the personal 
experience of a journalist who had been 
in a coma for a month, and recovered 
without serious problems (a not 
uncommon outcome after a short coma). 
On the basis of his experience he 
concluded by expressing concern about 
vegetative patients being allowed to die, 
stating that: ‘if it [the fMRI research] leads 
to doctors becoming more cautious 
about condemning patients, I, for one, 
will be relieved’ (16 September, 2006).  
Reporting routinely confused states such 
as ‘coma’, ‘vegetative’ and ‘minimally 
conscious’, slipping between the terms in 
a way that obsfucated the findings of the 
fMRI research. In addition, journalists 
used language and metaphors evoking 
‘locked in syndrome’ – the condition 
made famous by Bauby’s 1997 book 
(and the subsequent film) ‘The Diving Bell 
and the Butterfly’ (Bauby 1997); and 
more recently by Tony Nicklinson’s ‘right-
to-die’ legal case. It is quite possible that 
severely brain injured individuals are 
both in disordered states of 
consciousness and are also functionally 
locked in to some extent, however, the 
use of the phrase ‘locked in’ risks 
implying that patients who show brain 
activity via fMRI might have fully 
functioning minds and merely have lost 
the ability to communicate. The Daily 
Mail even used the fMRI work with 
vegetative patients as a hook on which 
to hang a report about a locked-in 
individual who had been: ‘frozen in his 
body, unable to move or speak, yearning 
for someone to hear his silent screams’, 
and the headline declared ‘But just look 
at him now…’ – going on to describe 
how he now works as a website 
developer and ‘is about to embark on a 
BSc in computer science and be married 
to a beautiful blond’ (5 February, 2010).  
Potential confusion about the level of 
cognitive ability detected via the fMRI 
studies was compounded by two senior 
figures who made public statements (on 
the Science Media website, and in 
Science respectively (Naccache 2006) 
suggesting that the fMRI studies revealed 
the patient’s ‘rich’ or ‘complex’ inner 
mental life – quotes which were picked 
up by newspapers such as The Times 
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and the Daily Mail (8 September, 2006). 
Such remarks have been strongly 
challenged by other experts in the field. 
Fins and Schiff (2006), for example, 
comment:  
The dramatic assertion … that ‘the 
fMRI findings indicate the 
existence of a rich mental life’ – is 
simply unjustifiable. The data do 
not show this. She may possess a 
rich mental life, but the more likely 
scenario is that, like many patients 
in MCS, this woman can follow 
commands yet remains unable to 
communicate and carry out goal-
directed and intentional 
behaviours because of generalized 
cognitive impairment (Fins & Schiff 
2006: 8). 
However, most of the press reporting of 
both the 2006 and the subsequent 2010 
scientific papers presented no caveats 
about the level of cognitive function such 
patients might possess. Journalists in 
2010 also missed the opportunity to 
note that the ‘coma woman’ who made 
headlines in 2006 for being able to ‘hear’ 
and ‘talk’ to doctors reappears in the 
2010 study – still in a disordered state of 
consciousness, and unable to use fMRI 
for communication. (This fact, which 
might have presented a different type of 
story is embedded in the full academic 
journal, but not commented upon in the 
press release).  
Some of the reporting did not simply 
neglect to question the level of 
understanding or potential for 
communication uncovered by the fMRI 
research, but actually used language, 
association or metaphors in ways which 
implied a quite sophisticated level of 
thinking.1 Some journalists attributed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Some newspapers (but only a minority; n=10) 
did question the level of consciousness 
self-reflection to patients, ventriloquising 
through headlines such as ‘I think … I’m 
alive’ (Sun February 4, 2010). They 
suggested that patients might eventually 
be able to make their own life/death 
choices2 and used words like ‘power’ to 
describe what fMRI might unleash. The 
Times, for example, picked up on the 
language used in the MRC’s 2010 press 
statement through its headline referring 
to the patient who ‘communicates 
…using the power of thought’ (4 
February, 2010) and other reports 
characterized fMRI as a liberating 
technology, reaching ‘into the shuttered 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!
uncovered by the research. For example, four 
news articles in the 2006 sample picked up on a 
statement by Paul Matthews (Professor of 
neuroscience) which had been posted on the 
UK’s Science Media Centre’s website. He 
observed that the authors do not ‘establish…that 
she [the patient] had self-awareness’. Some 
guest/specialist writers also unpacked the issue. 
The Independent’s Health Editor, Jeremy 
Laurance, highlighted that: ‘Having awareness is 
not the same as having a biographical life with 
feelings, thoughts and memories. A lot more goes 
into forming the human personality than a mere 
set of neurons and synapses’ (Independent 5 
February, 2010). Similar points were made in 
guest pieces – one written by Sheila McLean, 
(Emeritus Professor of Law and Ethics in 
Medicine), the other by John Harris (Professor of 
Bioethics). 
2 The fMRI scientific studies enter the on-going 
debate about the withdrawal/continuation of life 
support for patients in a disorder of 
consciousness (Fisher & Appelbaum 2010) – this 
debate is beyond the scope of the present article. 
However, we would note that fMRI is highly 
unlikely to be a tool to facilitate such patients 
making their own serious medical treatment 
decisions because ‘the likelihood is that the 
answers we seek will be vague, misleading, or 
simply unobtainable, despite all the technology’ 
(Fins & Schiff 2010: 23) and even those who can 
exhibit wilful modulation of brain activity 
‘probably do not possess the legal capacity to 
fully consent to or refuse life-sustaining 
treatment because of remaining cognitive deficits 
and the limits and uncertainties of this 
communication technique’ (Jox et al. 2012: 734). 
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world of a lost brain damaged patient’ 
(Herald 4 February, 2010), opening up 
opportunities for patients who had been 
‘closed off from the world’ (Express 4 
February, 2010), ‘unlocking’ the ‘inner 
voice’ (Telegraph 4 February, 2010) and 
freeing victims who had been 
‘imprisoned’ (Guardian 11 September, 
2006), ‘trapped’ and ‘shut off from life’ 
(Guardian 4 February, 2010). In one 
instance, writing about the 2010 study, 
Colin Blakemore, Professor of 
Neuroscience at the Universities of 
Oxford and Warwick, opened his 
generally reflective piece with compelling 
imagery which analogised a vegetative 
patient with the (fully conscious) victims 
of the Haiti earthquake. He compared 
‘the uplifting images of people pulled 
from the rubble of Haiti’ with ‘the 
extraordinary report from neuroscientists 
who have used a brain scanner to 
communicate with a very different kind 
of trapped victim – a patient in a 
Persistent Vegetative State’ (Telegraph 5 
February, 2010). His imagery captures 
(perhaps with a deliberate edge of satire) 
the recurring imagery of rescue which 
permeated the reporting. 
With a few exceptions, then, fMRI was 
presented with a sense of optimism, 
offering hope for further recovery and/or 
hope for a future in which assistive 
technologies could help patients 
communicate and make their own 
choices. ‘Hope’ was a word repeatedly 
evoked in the text, and highlighted in 
captions – the Sun, for example, 
illustrated its report of the 2006 study 
with a ‘sleeping-beauty’ image of a 
comatose patient with the caption ‘Hope’ 
(see Fig 2). It was rare to see any caveats 
about the interpretation of the studies, or 
the extent to which the technology could 
deliver on the ambitions of the scientists 
eager to develop its potential. For 
example, only one journalist – Mark 
Henderson (Science Editor for The Times) 
– commented on the costs and 
accessibility of fMRI technology – and 
that was very much in passing: ‘an 
expensive and difficult procedure that 
can be done only infrequently’ (The 
Times 4 February, 2010). 
 
In spite of the fact that families of brain 
injured patients, as well as patients 
themselves, were the presumed 
beneficiaries of the amazing 
breakthroughs, families were not the 
source of a single direct 
comment/quote. Like the silent patients, 
who could not be interviewed because of 
their condition, families too were 
silenced or ventriloquised. When families 
were mentioned, reporting was usually 
limited to describing the research as 
giving families ‘comfort’ (The Times 4 
February, 2010), that they were ‘happy’ 
with the results (Guardian 4 February, 
2010) and that the ‘revelation’ produced 
by fMRI ‘gives a huge boost to families’ 
(Sun 8 September, 2006). The findings 
were said to ‘give hope …that when they 
talk their loved one might be able to 
hear their words after all’ (Mail 8 
September,, 2006), as well as ‘hope … 
that loved ones … benefit from their 
endearments’ (Mail 16 September, 
2006).3 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Only three reports suggested reactions could be 
more complicated – two examples were from 
guest writers (e.g. Professor of palliative medicine 
Ilora Finlay, The Times, 4 February 2010), the 
other was from specialist Science Editor, Roger 
Highfield who briefly mentioned that: ‘The science 
team is also uneasy about how the families of 
vegetative patients will react to the discovery that 
a patient who…fulfils all the criteria…of 
vegetative state…could possibly have an inner 
mental life’ (Telegraph 8 September, 2006).  
 
!
!
&!
!www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal  @JOMECjournal!
 
 
Figure 2: The ‘sleeping beauty’ image of the 
comatosed patient – with the caption ‘Hope’ 
(Sun, 8 September 2006) 
 
 
Family responses to fMRI and the 
media coverage 
 
The interviews with family members 
challenge some of the optimism of the 
coverage and offer a more nuanced 
sense of how families anticipate the 
future heralded by fMRI, the role and 
possibility of ‘hope’, and their views and 
experience of ‘recovery’. Family members 
responded to the fMRI studies with a 
range of views including both excitement 
and cynicism, hope and fear, and their 
comments provide insight into how 
families negotiate their expectations, 
alongside the realities of day-to-day life, 
and offer a powerful correction to 
simplistic hype about what fMRI will 
deliver. 
All of the interviewees saw some 
potential benefits from fMRI, at least in 
theory. They were glad that some 
attention was being given to a vulnerable 
population, so often ignored and 
invisible. Some hoped this might 
eventually lead to more understanding of 
brain injury or possibly establishing 
some rudimentary communication. Eli, 
for example, whose husband was in a 
minimally conscious state, says: ‘it’s 
about seeing if you can improve 
somebody’s quality of life… if you can 
strap them in an MRI scanner … and say 
‘are you cold?’’. However, such 
observations were sometimes tempered 
by the interviewee’s sense that there 
were already ways of detecting some 
aspects of their relatives’ experience – 
(e.g. ‘she does tell us if she’s in pain, she 
has tears running down her face and 
bites on her bottom lip…. every part of 
her is stiff and unyielding’) and that such 
clearly communicated needs were not 
being met. Interviewees also reported 
break downs in care for their relative due 
to a lack of staff expertise with existing 
equipment (e.g. the hoists used to move 
patients around) and failures to provide 
or repair it (e.g. obtaining and maintain 
appropriate wheelchairs). They were 
acutely aware of the context of care 
delivery, and thus sometimes questioned 
what fMRI could deliver in practice, even 
if the scientists were successful in their 
ambitions to develop its capability in 
ideal laboratory settings.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This is a consistent finding in other research 
with families with severely brain injured relatives 
– where the recruitment method meant they had 
no special interest in fMRI. These interviewees 
expressed cynicism about how fMRI would work 
in practice making comments such as: ‘if she 
can’t even be given a call button that works for 
her I don’t really hold out much hope for the 
miracles offered by super-duper high powered 
science brain scanning’. They also referred to 
incidents in care homes where they has seen 
communication aids for severely disabled 
residents fall into disrepair, be left out of reach, 
or deliberately removed. Family members of one 
PVS patient, for example,, expressed their lack of 
hope for any improved quality of life for her, even 
were she to gain more awareness. Their 
perspective was partly informed by the distress 
they could see awareness bring to other patients 
who emerged from disordered states of 
consciousness, and partly by their 
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For some interviewees, however, an 
immediate benefit of fMRI was that it 
ensured that their own observations of 
consciousness were endorsed. For 
example some thought that they (and 
often care staff intimately caring for their 
relative too) saw more consciousness 
and communication than clinicians 
acknowledged. As Trudy comments: ‘As a 
mum, you’re with them so much more 
constantly and you see things … and 
they [the staff] don’t believe you’. This 
point was echoed by Eli: ‘it was quite 
obvious to everybody [care staff and 
family] that he understood what was 
going on…. I knew he was in there’, 
adding ‘[the fMRI test meant] they knew 
he was in there as well.’ However, 
beyond this strategic view of fMRI, the 
extent to which they personally pinned 
their hopes on the research, or felt it 
offered potential for the future, differed 
strongly between interviewees, and these 
views also shifted over time for 
individuals. 
Two of the six interviewees had been 
very excited by the fMRI research – at 
least at first. Both had first encountered 
information about fMRI via the media. 
Their responses mirrored the sort of 
family reactions anticipated in 
newspaper reports – and indeed had 
been originally directly triggered by such 
reporting:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!
disillusionment in witnessing, for example, the 
treatment of a particular young man: ‘he had all 
this awareness, he had one of these machines 
and he could say ‘I need some attention’ and 
then press the button and in the end because he 
liked playing with it […] then they would switch 
his machine off, because he was doing it all the 
time…/ Bea: And that upset you a bit didn’t it?/ 
Ann: Yes, I was thinking, how is this affecting 
him?/ Bea: Yeah – ‘you’ve got a voice, now you 
haven’t’ (Kitzinger & Kitzinger 2012; see also 
Latchem & Kitzinger 2012).  
I was really, really excited I was, 
that was the first thing, ‘cause I 
wanted to find out if there was 
anything really going on in Tracey 
and I can remember saying to the 
nurses at [the hospital] ‘look at 
this. This is amazing, this is 
amazing’ (Trudy) 
I have heard of fMRI when I was 
looking for miracles … I thought 
(loud gasp) ‘wow this is it, this is 
the thing I need for Ronald, it’s 
going to prove everything (Rachel) 
Both these women were initially 
enthusiastic about their relatives’ 
participation in fMRI studies: indeed 
Rachel had taken the initiative in trying 
to ensure her relative’s inclusion:  
I emailed him through the 
Cambridge website I said ‘hello 
Doctor Adrian Owen’ and … I 
thought I must be the only one 
emailing him and the generic 
email I got back saying ‘we receive 
hundreds of emails from people 
desperate you know like from 
families after all this’ and I thought 
‘oh’ (laughs) I naively thought … he 
would see my case and go ‘oh this 
women, what a horrible time she 
has, I must ship her here’ 
Rachel was bitterly disappointed when 
she learned that it would be difficult to 
access fMRI because – contrary to the 
expectations raised in her by media 
reporting – the imaging was only 
available as part of scientific studies: 
‘they [husband’s clinical team] said ‘look 
it’s not that simple, it’s not like there’s 
just one in every hospital’ and I’m like ‘oh 
why not? why don’t we have these in 
every hospital?’ and then they’re like “we 
haven’t been able to arrange it, there’s 
not any studies going on…”. I was like 
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“studies? This is life you know it’s his 
life…”’.  
It is noteworthy that both Trudy and 
Rachel became aware of fMRI work early 
on after their relative’s injury – and this 
seems to have been one factor in their 
enthusiastic response at the time. By 
contrast, other interviewees were more 
circumspect. This was particularly true of 
Laura, who first encountered news about 
fMRI several years after her daughter’s 
injury. She recalls that she was ‘not 
excited, no, more question marks I 
think… no, I’d never view it as exciting’. 
She did question if this was something 
she would want for her daughter but 
soon learned about the practical 
challenges such as the difficulties of 
moving Lavena, and the challenges of 
scanning her because of her spasms. 
After further discussion with her 
daughter’s consultant, she says ‘I think 
my feelings of unease [about fMRI] grew. 
And a feeling of uncertainty and almost 
say dread in a way…it’s not something 
that I could personally put Lavena 
through’. She reflects that research has 
to happen, but that ‘it’s modern 
technology that has put Lavena where 
she is today’. She would rather than 
technology has not been used to ‘save’ 
Lavena’s life in the first place and she is 
cynical about technological solutions to 
the profound dilemmas she, her 
daughter, and whole family now face. 
Laura’s allusion to feelings of 
‘uncertainty’ and ‘almost dread’ indicates 
far more than a cynicism about fMRI – it 
expresses her fear that the technology 
might detect some brain activity, and 
‘where do they go from there?’. She 
expands on her concerns: 
It’s like a double edge sword 
because if we found that there was 
nothing there in a way that 
would’ve been easier … how do 
we handle it if there is something 
there but there’s not a damn thing 
that we can do to get to her 
In stark contrast to the newspaper’s 
report that the positive fMRI results ‘give 
hope to victims’ families that when they 
talk their loved one might be able to 
hear their words’, Laura highlights the 
double-edged implications as she tries 
to cope with her life and care for other 
members of her family who, like her, are 
suffering the long term implications of 
having a family member in Lavena’s 
condition: ‘…if I knew that things were 
going on in Lavena I’d spend much more 
time with her…I’d talk to her a lot more 
and so on and of course then that would 
impact on us all’. She adds that also 
‘we’d feel so guilty that we haven’t tried 
harder to get through to her but yet we 
know that everything has been done you 
know … so it’s quite complicated to 
unravel’. 
By contrast, another interviewee, Rachel, 
is fearful about what the fMRI might 
show for quite a different reason. Rachel 
was initially very excited by fMRI and 
determined to access it for her husband. 
However, her enthusiasm did not last. 
Indeed, she subsequently became 
concerned that fMRI might fail to detect 
any brain activity and that this would be 
a weapon that could be turned against 
her. The history here is one of conflict 
with clinicians about her husband’s 
diagnosis and prognosis. Rachel reports: 
‘… he had an EEG that proved terrible 
against him … I decided after that EEG 
that I did not want the fMRI. I thought 
‘well I don’t want any more evidence 
against him’’. She also fears an fMRI 
might potentially ‘steal’ the hope she has 
that Ronald will recover: ‘you go in there 
full of hope’, she said, ‘like you’re going to 
get the result … and then when he 
doesn’t [get the positive result] … it 
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makes me feel a bit downhearted’. She 
adds: ‘whilst it’s out there [the possibility 
of a positive result] it’s not dashed it’s 
still a hope, but once you do it…. you 
feel a bit sunken’. 
As the above comments make clear, 
‘hope’ is a key issue for these 
interviewees. It is an important coping 
mechanism, but also a dangerous need, 
making them vulnerable to ‘false hope’ in 
their search for a solution. Indeed, a 
determination to hold on to hope can 
even be implicated in their relatives 
being subject to interventions that the 
families later regret (see Kitzinger & 
Kitzinger 2012)). Laura, for example, 
remarked: ‘we just had…such hope 
didn’t we? [turning to husband] …we just 
clung on to everything .[…]… in the early 
stages we would’ve done anything’. 
Rachel echoed this: ‘the thing is when 
you’re going through all the distress and 
the pain you search for anything don’t 
you’. Some of the interviewees, were 
concerned about the sense of 
excitement generated by the coverage of 
fMRI. Alison, for example, worries that the 
coverage would cause people to be ‘filled 
with hope and then possibly to be let 
down’. She also expresses concern that 
the media coverage fuels the 
misunderstanding of friends and relatives 
who make glib comments like ‘where 
there’s life there’s hope’. Alison 
comments: ‘for just an ordinary person 
who had absolutely no understanding of 
it whatsoever that [the reporting] would 
probably be ‘wow you know look what 
they can do now’.’ Two of the 
interviewees had become critical of the 
media coverage that had previously 
inspired them: 
They [the newspaper articles] are 
really misleading because they 
give you hope and I suppose whilst 
all you cry for is a bit of hope I do 
understand why they [doctors] 
don’t give you it because when you 
get given it …you make your own 
conclusions don’t you? And you 
twist what’s been said … that’s 
what doctors don’t want you to do, 
they don’t want you to hear 
something different from what 
they’re saying and that’s what the 
media does. It changes everything 
and makes you think there’s 
answers out there that just aren’t 
(Rachel) 
All of the family members who took part 
in this study had, by the time of 
interview, reached a point far removed 
from any fantasies of, for example, their 
relative recovering such that he might 
‘embark on a BSc in computer science 
and be married to a beautiful blond’ (as 
happened to the locked-in syndrome 
individual who featured in one of the 
press reports in our sample). Exposure to 
information from clinicians has given 
them the understanding that any patient 
who has been vegetative or minimally 
conscious for a long time is never likely 
to make a complete recovery – for 
example, even if they do recover full 
consciousness they will not fully recover 
physical abilities or memory, and may be 
left with severe neurological deficits. 
Most will always require 24/7 care and 
never regain the cognitive ability to make 
their own serious medical decisions, let 
alone be restored to who they had been 
in other ways. Interviewees had not only 
learned about this reality from their 
clinical teams, they had also seen what 
recovery meant through their 
experiences in care homes, and what 
they had witnessed in other families that 
they now knew. In this sense they all felt 
their relative was irretrievably lost (at 
least in their previous form of existence) 
(Holland et al in press). Interviewees 
stressed, however, that this was a 
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realisation that usually took time to 
accept:  
In the first year you’re not really 
ready to hear how difficult it’s 
going to be ‘cos I know I used to 
think – ‘this is [Andrew] he’s big, 
he’s strong, he’ll fight back, you 
know, he’ll come back to us’ and it 
takes quite a while to kind of get 
that wiped out of you if you like 
[…] You do recognise I think that 
you’re never going to get that 
person back again as they were. 
(Alison) 
In this context interviewees told a very 
different story of recovery than that 
implied in the newspaper coverage. 
While worried that their relative might, in 
some sense, be ‘trapped’, they did not 
see fMRI as providing a ‘telepathic leap’, 
bringing their loved one back to them. 
They did not think the technology could 
find the person who was lost, unlocking 
their prison or rescuing them from the 
rubble. Their ambitions are more modest 
– that their relative might, for example, 
be able to clearly indicate whether they 
were too hot or too cold. A number of 
interviewees spoke about the 
improvements they had witnessed in 
their relatives’ conditions, giving a picture 
of what recovery meant to them that was 
very far removed from that conjured up 
in some media reports. They made 
comments such as ‘he yawns now, he 
never used to yawn…’ or referred to the 
progress that the patient could now stick 
her tongue out, but none (with the 
possible exception of Rachel) now 
believed that their relative would ‘come 
back’ as they were. Trudy, for example, 
speaks excitedly about the progression 
her daughter, Tracey, has made and her 
sense of future possibilities: ‘at one point 
the speech and language therapist said 
she couldn’t really move her mouth at 
all, she couldn’t poke her tongue 
out…oh my goodness she does all sorts 
now, so never say never’ (Trudy). 
However, at the same time she suggests 
in some ways she will never ‘recover’ her 
daughter, even though her daughter has, 
in some ways, recovered (she is now fully 
conscious). While committed to being 
positive about Tracey’s progress she 
expresses a deep sense of loss: 
You’re always mourning the person 
you’ve lost so in a way, it’s going to 
sound horrible but death would 
have been an easier option 
…you’re mourning all the time for 
that lost daughter but … how we 
dealt with it [is], I lost her, I lost 
that daughter, but I got another 
one (Trudy) 
Eli similarly reported some minimal 
progress in husband’s condition as the 
months turned into years: ‘he could turn 
his head and he would watch and um, 
once or twice...he tried to talk’. However, 
over time, with this slow and minimal 
progress, and a sense of the narrowing 
possibilities, hope becoming exhausted. 
Her perspective is vividly illustrated in 
her account of her husband’s eventual 
death. She had rushed to his bedside, 
filled with grief, but when he appeared to 
rally for a moment she was also aware 
that she had no hope left: 
He’d calmed down to very light 
breathing, and it was fairly normal 
and I actually sat there and in my 
head I thought ‘Don’t do this to us. 
Don’t recover and then three 
months later do it again, and then 
six months later do it again. That’s 
not fair on me or the family’. So, I 
didn’t wish him dead…., but yes, 
[the media implies] ‘where there is 
life there is hope’ – Hope of what? 
What are you hoping for? … When 
[my daughters] says ‘oh Mummy 
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do you miss my Daddy’, I say I do 
but I wouldn’t have him back like 
that. That was not fair on him, let 
alone us (Eli) 
This interviewee also explicitly critiques 
the glib use of the term ‘hope’ in media 
reports: 
I’m struggling with that word, not 
that I don’t believe in an afterlife 
but it [what the article is referring 
to] is hope for this life. [...] my 
question would be there’s hope for 
whom? For [the patient] to make 
any further recovery? Probably not. 
[...] …so basically hope for what? 
(Eli) 
 
Discussion and conclusion: ‘hope for 
whom? … hope for what?’ 
Our analysis of media coverage has 
highlighted the generally optimistic 
nature of reporting – adding a timely 
example to existing research on the 
‘hype’ around science. Such hype, we 
would argue, is not simply ‘media 
sensationalism’ produced by journalists, 
but (taking a view from within the 
‘sociology of expectations’ framework) is 
part of a deliberate effort by scientists 
(and science funding bodies) to promote 
their work and enrol support and 
resources for its development. The 
analysis presented in this article has 
illustrated some of the ways in which this 
strategy was pursued in relation to the 
novel neurotechnology of fMRI.  
Our research also highlights the gap 
between how fMRI was promoted in 
much of the coverage, and the 
experiences of families who have to face 
the question ‘hope for whom’ and ‘hope 
for what?’ The public representation of 
fMRI breakthroughs generally conveyed a 
simple story of excitement and hope, but 
relatives of patients in disordered states 
of consciousness grapple with the 
everyday realities. They face the fact, 
ignored by much of the reporting, that, 
access to fMRI is currently not available 
outside certain studies (‘studies? This is 
life you know it’s his life’) and that not all 
patients can be scanned (spasms and 
metal plates in the skull can make 
patients ineligible and even transporting 
them to an fMRI location may present 
insurmountable challenges (Tovino 
2008)). Families live with the knowledge 
that ‘recovering’ their lost loved one is 
not an option and that they need to 
think of ‘recovery’, if it happens at all, in 
terms of small steps unlikely to go 
beyond a type of severe disability that 
remains invisible in media reports. They 
also have to deal with the emotional 
complexity of brain activity being 
detected, or not, and have often become 
acutely aware that there are no easy 
answers (‘that’s what the media 
does...makes you think there’s answers 
out there that just aren’t’). The 
interviewees are also operating in a 
world of disempowerment – struggling 
with what counts as evidence of 
consciousness (e.g. whether or not 
clinicians take into account family 
observations); what consequences will 
follow from fMRI results (what options 
are available and who makes treatment 
decisions) and questions about the role 
of technological advances in general and 
the very definition of hope itself. 
Our analysis has implications for those 
promoting scientific research – 
underlining the need to take into 
account a range of ethical, social and 
economic factors before making 
pronouncements about the role and 
‘promise’ of such interventions. As Fins 
and Schiff declare, ‘despite 
neuroimaging’s investigative promise, like 
most technologies, we also need to 
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determine when it need not be used’ 
(Fins & Schiff 2010: 23; see also Jox et al 
2012). Our research has particular 
implications for all those representing 
and reporting neuro-scientific work via 
the mass media: funding bodies, 
scientists, press officers and journalists 
(from headline writers to editors). These 
implications include the responsibility, as 
has been noted by many 
recommendations before, to avoid 
generating ‘false hope’ and be wary of 
over-claiming for stories (e.g Science 
Media Centre 2013). Beyond this our 
analysis also highlights the need to: be 
careful with terminology and metaphors 
(e.g. the language of ‘locked in’); beware 
of making inappropriate comparisons 
(e.g. with the short term coma 
experiences); consider the potentially 
misleading power of images (e.g. the 
brain ‘lighting up’); reflect on the wider 
social context in which technologies will 
(or will not) be made available; and seek 
out a wider range of comment (including 
accessing the perspectives of patients, 
carers, and families where possible). For 
those working in the media our analysis 
particularly highlights the need to avoid 
churnalism (merely reproducing the core 
press release). It also, as shown by 
previous work on science reporting, 
underlines the value of specialist 
journalists, and the potentially enriching 
contribution of guest writers (suggesting 
a role for academics and practitioners 
writing responses to news reporting of 
science). 
While summarising such recommend-
ations we are aware of the context in 
which public representation of science 
occurs. This includes the fact that: 
journalists are working under difficult 
circumstances and competing to gain 
space and attract audiences (Williams & 
Clifford 2009); funding bodies and 
scientists are competing to demonstrate 
the impact of their research; and that 
fundamental to the profession of science 
press officers is the necessity to write 
press releases which are alluring to 
journalists. At each level, then, there are 
‘institutional and structural forces to add 
a ‘pinch of hype’’ (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2013: 219), and it is the 
cumulative effect of this hype that is 
evident in the final media 
representations. We suggest, therefore, 
on a grand, long-term scale, that there 
needs to be more questioning of the 
fundamental structures and agendas 
involved in disseminating science to the 
public. More short-term, and easier to 
implement, we suggest that scientific 
press releases, especially those which 
report work with ambitions to bring ‘real 
world’ social benefits, should include 
comments from social science 
researchers with expertise in the area – 
not just scientists. Indeed, perhaps a 
database of social science experts to 
draw upon for quotations or expert 
commentary about science – similar to 
the scientist database created by the 
UK’s Science Media Centre – should be a 
priority (indeed this might usefully be 
developed by a body such as the 
Science Media Centre to complement 
their existing work). It may also be that 
funding bodies could all agree on a new 
format for press releases that would 
routinely include a clear statement of 
limitations rather than simply putting the 
most positive spin possible on what has 
been achieved. This would, we suggest, 
be an appropriate way for funding bodies 
to take responsibility for the fact that 
many science PR materials now end up 
translated directly into media output with 
little modification. In conclusion, the 
science of fMRI is fascinating, and may 
have the potential to increase 
understanding and improve treatment 
and decision-making for severely brain 
injured individuals – it could also do 
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harm. There is a need for great care in 
how this is explored and translated into 
the public domain.  
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